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Landau addresses three questions about military  of GNP and the peacetime growth rate of
spending in developing countries:  developing countries - except where military
spending  is high.
* What are levels of (and trends in) military
spending as a percentage of gross national  He finds that higher shares of MES are not
product?  associated with lower shares of government
spending on education, health, and infrastructure.
* What impact does peacetime military  As MES increases, government spending as a
spending have on growth, government spending  share of GNP increases, which allows the level
on social  welfare and infrastructure, and other  of spending on health, education, and
key economic variables?  infrastructure to be maintained.
* What major factors influence the level of  He finds some evidence that increased
military spending?  military spending in the developing countries has
a weak negative impact on investment and the
Landau finds that military spending as a  balance of trade. He finds no evidence of a
share of GNP generally fell in the 1980s, even in  statistically significant relationship between
the Middle East and North Africa. The mean  military spending and inflation.
level of military expenditure as a share of GNP
(MES) was 3.9 percent, well below the peak of  The most important determinant of
5.3 percent in 1976. In 1989, MES averaged only  peacetime military spending is the spending level
2.7 percent in Latin America and 2.0 percent in  of neighboring countries-  in other words, the
Sub-Saharan Africa - the two regions with the  potential external threaL Regional conciliation
most severe economic problems.  and disarmament may be an important step
toward reduced military spending.
He finds no evidence of a negative
relationship between military spending as a share
T'hePolicy Research Working PaperoSeriesdisseminates  thefodings  of work under way in theBank. Anobjectiveof  the series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. Th - findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent of  ficial Bank policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTHE ECONOMC IMACT  OF  TARY EXES
by
Daniel LandauTable  of  QW=
Abstnct  .....................................  .....................  .........  i
Summary  ...............  .......................  fi
I. lNTRODUCIION  ........................................  ...  ....  1
U. LEVELS  OF MILTARY  EXPENDITURE  ...............................  2
m. MILITARY  SPENDING  AND  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  ...........  ............  4
A.  Hypothesis ......................................  4
B.  Model  Specification  .......................................  6
C.  Data  ................................  . 8
D.  Results  . .....................................  . 9
Tl e  Relationship  Between  Milex  and  Ecowomic  Growd  . . 9
Ot.&er  Regressors..........  ..............  .9
Sensitivity  Analysis..  9
Changing  the Specification  .. 10
Robustness  ........................ ,,  10
Robustness  vis-a-vis  Outliers .........  11
E.  Military  Expenditres and  Growth:  Channels  of Impat .................  14
IV. OTHER  ECONOMIC  IMPACTS  OF MILITARY  EXPENDITURES  .....  ..........  16
A.  Impact  on Government  Social  and  Ifrastrucure SpeWing.  ....  ..........  16
B.  hImact  on  Other  Economic  Variables. .......  .............  . is
V. DETERMINANTS  OF MLITARY  EXPENDITURE  ......  ...................  19
VI. CONCLUSIONS  ................................................  20
REFERENCES  .................................. 30
Variable  List
Table  I  Patterms  of Military  Experditure
Table  2  Cross  Section  Regressions
Table  3  Regressions  of the Difference  in Growth  Rata  Betwee Succouive  Mulid-yer
Periods  on the Differences  in the Regressors
Table  4  Summary  of Regressions  by Geographic  Regiom
Table  S  Dropping  Various  Regions
Table  6  Channels  of Impact
Table  7  Testing  the Efficiency  Hypcthesis
Table  8  Impact of  Milex On  The Level and Composiion of  Cal  GovNment
Expediture 197089
Table  9  Impact  of MES  on Key  Economic  Variables
Table 10  The Dem  ir of Military  Exp  _end  - MES. i -
Abstract
Levels of military spending in developing countries  have been falling and are relatively low in
areas with economic  problems. Military spending is mostly motivated  by external threats.  In general,
at typical  current levels (about  4 percent of GDP), military  expenditure  is not associated  with lower rates
of economic  growth, government  social and infrastructure  spending, or capital formation, or with higher
inflation.
l7ds research  project was  fiaded  by a grant  from the World  Bank's Research  Support Budget,
managed by Sanjay Pradhan.  The author would like to dtnk  Shanta Devarajan, Sawjay  Pradhan and
Vlnaya  Swaroopfor many helpfid comments  and suggestions.- ii  -
Summary
This  paper  presents  the results  of research  on three  aspect of military  spending  in the developing
countries.  What  are  the levels  and  trends  in military  spending  as a percentage  of national  product?  What
is the  impact  of peacetime  military  spending  on growth,  governmeni  social  and  infrastructure  expenditure,
and  other  key  economic  variables?  What  are the major  factors  influencing  the  level  of military  spending?
In terms  of the levels  of military  spending,  Landau  finds  that military  spending  shares  in GNP
were generally  falling  during  the 1980s,  including  the highest  spending  areas  of the Middle  East and
North  Africa.  The mean  level  of military  expenditure  as a share  in GNP  (MES)  in 1989  wss 3.9%,  much
below  the peak  of 5.3  percent  in 1976. In 1989,  in the areas  with  the most  severe  economic  problems,
Latin  America  and Sub-Saharan  Africa,  MES  averaged  only 2.7% and  2.0%, respectively.
Landau  studies  the impact  of military  spending  on economic  growth  with regressions  of the
growth  rate of real GNP on MES  and other important  determinants  of growth.  The regressions  use a
sample  of 71 countries  with  a population  of 2 million  or more. The data  cover  the time  period  1969-89.
Landau's  hypothesis  is  that  the  impact  of military  expenditure  (milex)  on growth  is a combination  of three
effects: (1) increased  security  - positive  impact  on growth;  (2) milex  is related  to external  threat  and
hence  pressure  for more  efficient  government  policies  in response  to external  threat  (or "policy  efficiency
effects"  - positive  impact;  and  (3) diversion  of resource' rom  productive  investment  - negative  impact.
Further,  he hypothesizes  that the combination  of these effects  will produce  a non-linear  (quadratic)
relationship  between  milex  and  growth: at low  levels  of milex,  there  will  be a positive  impact  on growth
due  to increased  security  and  efficiency,  while  at higher  levels  of milex,  the  negative  resource-use  impact
will  lead  to lower  growth. For the full  sample  of 71 countries,  he finds  a non-linear  relationship  between
MES  and the growth  rate.  Initially  increases  in MES  are associated  with faster  growth  and beyond  a
cerain level they are associated  with slower  growth. However,  this result is being  driven  by the 24
countries  in the sample  from  Asia, the Middle  East, North  Africa,  and Southern  Europe,  which  account- iii  -
for onethird of total observations. When the regressions are run without these countries, there is no
significant  relationship,  positive or negative,  between MES and the growth rate.  Landau concludes  that
there is no evidence  of a negative  relationship  between the share of military spending in GNP and the
growth rate of the developing  countries (in peacetime)  until the military expenditure  share is quite high.
However, it is uncertain  whether  the non-linear  milex-growth  relationship  can be generalized  beyond the
Eurasia/North Africa region.
Landau also attempts to determine  empirically  the channels  through which military expenditure
influences economic  growth.  He finds evidence  for the hypothesized 'policy efficiency effect,'  i.e.,
military expenditure  is associated  with more efficient  policies  in respoise to an external  threat. However,
he flnds  no other  statistically  significant  channels )f impact. Specificaily,  the impact  of military  spending
on growth cannot be explained  by its effects on the levels of investment  in human or physical capital or
by its impact  on the balance  of payments.
Regarding  other economic  effects of military spending, he fnds that higher levels of MES are
not associated  with lower levels  of government  spending  on education,  health, and infrastructure  as shares
in GNP.  As MES increases, the share of total govc-nment  spending in GNP increases  which allows the
spending  on health, education  and infrastructure  as shares in GNP to be maintained  aithough  their shares
in total central governnent expenditure  are reduced.  'here  is some evidence  that increased military
spending in the developing  countries  has a very weak negative impact  on investment  and the balance  of
trade.  Landau finds no evidence  of a stadstically  significant  relationship  between military  spending and
the inflation  rate.
The major deerminants of military spending as a percemtage  of GNP are the average level of
military spending  of neighboring  countries  (the potendal threat), per capita  product, and the existence  of
actual iternational wars.  The most important  determint  of peacetime  military spending  is neighbors'
military spending levels.  This result suggests that, in general, military spending in the developing- iv -
countries  is a response  to potential  foreign  threats. This in turn suggests  that a country can  lower military
expenditures  if its neighbors  do so as well w that regional conciliation  and disarmament  could  be critical
positive steps for reductions in military expenditures.
As with all studies of the determinants  of growth, this study is constrained to work from an
incomplete  theoretical  basis, using proxies for some explanatory  factors and using imperfect  data.  In
addition, these particular findings apply to peacetime  military spending in the developing countries  and
are based on the years studied. War is an economic  as well as human disaster. With the changes  in the
world in the 1990s,  the relationship  between  developing  countries' military spending  and their economies
could also change.- I  -
I. INTROD),XrION
In recent  years,  there  has been  growing  concwn  about  the  possibly  harmful  effecls  of unfettered
military  expenditures  in developing  countries. It Is alleged  that these  expenditures  worsen  balance  of
payments  deficits,  undermine  7rowth  and *crowd  out" critical  economic  and  social  sector  expenditures,
with  adverse  implications  for the poor. Furthermore,  some  did  donors  fear that  development  assistance
Is  directdy  or indirecy financing  military  spending.  While  these  concerns  have  been  rdised  in the past,
the Gulf  War and the collapse  of the Soviet  Union  have  brought  the debate  into sharp focus. Indeed,
several  observers  have  suggested  making  development  assisance  explicitly  conditional  on reductions  in
military  expenditures.'  While defense conditionality  is ruled out for the World Bank,2 some bilateral
donors  are beginning  to impose  conditions  on military  spending.  In this  context,  it is worth  asking  what
the economic  effects  of military  expenditures  have  been.
This paper studies  several  aspects  of this question. First, it briefly  reviews  trends  in military
expeditures over time and across  regions  to provide  background  to the magnitude  and location  of the
problem. Second,  and most  important  for policy,  it analyzes  the effects  of military  expenditure  on the
economic  performance  of developing  countries.  How  does  military  expendtture  affect  economic  growth?
What  are the channels,  and  what  evidence  do we  have  that  these  are the  med1uvdsms?  What  is the impact
of military spending  on government  social and infrastructure  spending  and on other key economic
variables? The analysis  thus provides  insights  into the desirability  of reducing  military  expenditures.
Finaly, the paper  analyzes  the deerminants  of military  penditure,  which  need  to be taken  into  account
in Initives  to reduce  militarv  spending.
The  rest of the paper  is organized  as foilows. Section  II of the  paper  discusses  trends  in military
aependiture. Section M analyzes the relationship  between military spending  and growth.  Section IV
emine  other economic  impacts  of military  spending,  and Section  V idendfies  the determinants  of
miitay-2-
spending. Section VI summarizes  our findings.
11. LEVELS OF MIL1TARY  EXPENDiTURE
In order to analyze  the economic  effects of military expenditures,  it is useful to examine  trends
in such spending. Do some regions si 'ud more on the military  than others? Are military expondita.ts
increasing  over time? As discussed  in detail below, the available data suggest that military expenditure
has generally  been falling in recent years, that it is particularly  high in specific regions, and that the poor-
growth regions have relatively low levels of military spending.
A key problem in analyzing military expenditures Is obtaining reliable and accurate data on
aggregate  military  spending. Data from the Stockholm  International  Peace Renearch  Institute (SIPRI)  are
generally  more comprehensive  than those  of the IMP's Government  Financial  Statistics  (GFS)  or the U.S.
Arms Control  and Disarmament  Agency (ACDA). This paper  uses military  expenditure  data from SIPRI,
supplemented  by data from ACDA for some earlier years.
Table  1 gives the mean levels of the military expenditure share (percentage) in  GNP -
abbreviated  MES hereafter - for seven regions over the period 1969-89. In addition, it provides the
mean for all 71 countries in the sample ("PF!! Sample") and the mean excluding the Middle East and
North Africa ("Full Sample 2").3 As can be seen from Table 1 and Figure 1, the full sample was at its
lowest level in 1939 at 3.9 percent of GDP, much  below the peak of 5.3 percent in 1976. In the sample
excluding the high-spending  Middle East and North Africa, military spending has varied very little on
average over the years. In the Middle  East and North Africa, spending  in 1989 was far below their peak
levels.'  More important,  from the standpoint  of the relationship  between military  spending and growth,
the two regions with the most serious  growth problems  - Sub-Saharan  Africa and Latin America  - have
on average  been the lowest spenders  on the military. Overall, therefore, the figures show that the bigest.J3e
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spenders  are spending  less  and  that the average  is down  from  peal' levels  for the LDCs  as a whole  and
in most  regions. Consequently,  this inial
examination  suggests  neither  a heavy  "military  burden"  on the economy  - outside  the Middle  East  and
North  Africa  - nor a growing  military  burden. There  are of course  regions  (South  Asia)  and  countdes
(Honduras)  which  are excepdons  to these  general  trends  in military  expenditure.'
m.  MILifARY  SPENDING  AND  ECONOMIC  GROWTH
There  has been  considerable  research  on the relationship  between  militay expenditure  ("mllexc
for short) and economic  growth.  Most of the work is empirical;  attempts  to resolve the issues
theoretically  have  not  been  successful.  The empirical  studies  work  with  a wise  rray of specifications,
country  and time  period  samples,  and esdmating  methods. They  also reach  differing  conclusions  with
regard  to the impact  of miiitary  spending  on growth.
&AlaA  presents  brief survey  of the existing  literature. As further  explained  therein,  the
existing  literature  on military  expenditure  and economic  growth  is beset  by several  problems:  (I) there
are  significant  omitted  vt.iables  in the analysis;  (ii)  regressors  are not  lagged;  (iii)  the studies  often  cover
too short a time period; (iv) the regressors  for military exnditure  do not allow for non-linear
relationships;  (v)  the regressors  include  factors  influenced  by the level  of military  expenditure;  and  (vi)
military  expenditure  is treatd as a cost which  could  not possibly  be directly  beneficial  by providing
security.  Given  the  problems  with  the existing  literature,  we  developed  our own  approach,  making
use of the results  of the author's  previous  work  on the determna  ts of economic  growth  (Landau  1986,
1990).
A.  HIgeis
Our  hypothesis  is that  there  are  three  types  of effects  of military  expenditure  on economic  growth:
(i) resource use; (ii) security;  and (iii) policy efficiency. One, the resources  used for militaryexpenditares  are in gene  not  availablo  for invement; a  a result,  incresed military  spending  will  tend
to diminish  the growth  rate.  Two, for any given level of foreign  threat, the higher the millIary
expenditure  of a country,  the more  saure the country  i8.  The increased  security  will tend  to increase
private  investmeL  4  and  accelerate  growth. Three,  governments  of countries  under  strong  foreign  threat
need  a tax base that  can provide  the tax revenue  necessary  to build  strong  armed  forces. As a result,
developing  countries  facing  strong  foreign  threats  will  tend  to modify  their policies  in directions  which
facilitate  faster  economic  growth.7
The combination  of the three  effects  of military  spending  is hypothesized  to produce  a quadrtic
relationship  betwoen  the level of military  spending and  the growth rate. The  initidal  impact  of low levels
of milex  will be posidve  due to the security  and policy  efficiency  effects. Beyond  a certain  level,  the
impact  of military  spending  on growth  will be negative  as the resource  use effect  comes  to dominate.
Our  measure  of military  epditure  is the  miitary  expenditure  share  (MES)  in the national  product.  The
hypothesis  predicts  that  the coeffiriet for MES  will  be positdve  and  that  the coefficient  for MES  squared
QMES2)  will be negative.
The level  of MES  and the impact  of milex  on growth  will both  depend  on the degree  of threat
a country  faces. We measure  th  threat  by the share  of military  expenditure  of neighboring  countries
(NMES). NMES is the unweigted average  of the military  expenditure  shares for all neighboring
countries  of over two million  population.' There are two possible  effects  of the threat  represented  by
NMES:  (i) decreased  investmt  ad  growth  due to the threat  to human  and physical  assets; and (ii)
increased  policy  efficiency  in response  to the  threat. The second  effect  is the same  as that  hypothesized
for expenditure  MES. Our priors were  that the first effect  would  dominate  and NMES  would  have  a
negative  coefficient  In the growth  regessions.-6 -
B.  Model  Specification
We need  to embed  our hypothesis  about  the effects  of milex  on growth  in a general  model  of the
growth  process. We can  view  the  growth  rate, Y, as a function  of six  basic  economic  derminants: labor
(L);  natural  resources  (N);  physical  capital  (Kp);  human  capital  (Kh);  technology  (M);  and efficiency  (E).
(1)  y = f(L, N, Kp,  Kh, T, E)
The correct  functional  form for this equation  is not known. It would  probably  depend  on the rates  of
growth  of the six factors  and also their levels. These  six factors  are, in any case, only  the proximate
economic  determinants  of growth. The real questions  concern  what  determines  the levels  and rates  of
change  of these  six factors  for each  country  in each  time  period.
We could model  each of the six proximate  determinants  of growth  as a function  of various
fundamental  factors. For example,  the growth  rate  of  physical  capital  would  depend  on the factors  which
influence  the  expected return to  investment:  internal protection  of  property rights, political
stability/instability,  threats  of civil  and international  war,  the level  and rate  of growth  of human  capital,
technology  and its rate  of change,  international  economic  conditions.  After  we had  written  down  the six
functions  for the six proximate  determinants  of growth,  we would  combine  them with the function  in
equation  (1) to come up with a reduced form eWtion for growth in terms of its fundamental
determinants.  However,  knowledge  of the determinants  of growth  is not sufficient  even  to specify  the
six functions  for the proximate  determinants  of growth,  let alone  the reduced  form. In addition,  many
of the  variables  have  no quantitative  measures  - for example,  protection  of property  rights,  government-
caused  market  distortions,  historical  and  cultural  factors.
In order  to test the central  hypothesis  of this study,  the key regressors  constituted  MES,  MES2
and NMES,  as discussed  above. In addition,  those  variables  were selected  as regressors  that  met the
following  criteria:  (i) quantitative  data were available;  (ii) previous  research  has shown them to
significantly  influence  the  growth  rate  (either  in the reduced  form  equation  or as proxies  for the  proximate-7  -
determinants  of growth); and (iii) they are exogenous  with regard to the military expenditure  regressors  -
- MES and MES2. Based on these criteria, the following  regressors  were chosen: the growth rate of the
developed  countries  (GRW); the change  in the terms of trade (CTOT); per capita  product (PCP); the debt
burden as a share of GDP (DEBTS); the average life expectancy  at birth (LIFE); political condition
variables - instability  (PI), civil war (CW) and international  war (W);  and the share of fuel exports in
national product (OILS).'  The basic OLS regression equation is given below.  (CW and IW were not
statistically  significant  in the growth rate regressions.)
(2) y = bo + b,MES + b2MES2 + b3NMES + b 4GRW + b5CTOT + b 6PCP + b,DEBTS +
bELIFE  + bPI  + b10OILS + error
Since we are interested  in studying the impact  of military  expenditures  on long-term  growth, the
dependent  variable in the regressions  must be the average  growth rate over multi-year  periods rather than
single-year  growth rates. The change in real product  over one year, or even a few years, is a mix of the
real long-run growth of the economy  and cyclical changes  in the level of production. Since we do not
have an adequate  measure of the cyclical effects for the majority of developing countries, the only way
to get a dependent variable which is mainly real growth and to  minimize the cyclical element is to use
time periods as long as the data allow.  Consequendy, the dependent variable is the averagc annual
growth rate over six- and seven-year  periods of real GNP (in domestic currency at 1987  prices).  This
variable  was used in two forms: the growth rate of total GNP (abbreviated  "GRT"), and the growth rate
of GNP minus military expenditure  (abbreviated  'GRNM').
In order to examine  the long-term impact  of the regressors rather than their current impact, the
regressors were lagged.'°  If the regressors  are not lagged, no matter how long a period is included in
each observation,  we are only looking  at the average impact  of the current level of 'X' on current GNP;
we are not looling at the long-run effect of 'X'.  But it is the long-run effects we are interested  in:  if
military expenditure  increases  today, will future GNP be higher  or lower? Lagging the regressors  avoids-8-
the problem  of causality  - current  milex  could  cause  changes  in the current  growth  rate or changes  in
the current  growth rate could  cause changes  in the current level of milex.  In this light, the most
important  regressors  - MES, MES2,  NMES,  etc. - are the average  of the three years immediately
preceding  the six-  or seven-year  period  of the dependent  variable.' 1
Since the dependent  variable  is the average  growth over six to seven years and since the
regressors  are typically  threeyear  lagged  averages,  the regressions  using  data  for 196949  basically  test
the cross-section  relationship  between  military  expenditures  and  growth. 7"tare  are 71 countries  and at
most two observations  per country. Using  multi-year  growth  rates as the dependent  variable,  it is
difficult  to test the time  series  relationship  because  the share  of milex  in GNP  changes  slowly. To test
the effects  of changes  in MES on the growth  rate, we also regressed  differences  in the growth  rates
between  successive  non-overlapping  multi-year  periods  on differences  in the regressors.12  The sample
was also  broken  down  by geographic  regions: Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA),  Latin  America,  and all other
regions  (Asia,  Middle  East, North Africa and Southern  Europe  - ASMENASE).  Finer breakdowns
would  result  in too few  degrees  of freedom  in the regressions. 
C.  D=a
The data source  for the economic,  social,  and human  capital  variables  was the World  Bank's
World  Tables. This data  series  provides  annual  data  for the years  196949 and defines  the time  period
for the study.  As discussed  earlier, the military  expenditure  data were from the SIPRI Yarbo,
supplemented  by USACDA  data  when  necessary.  The political  condition  variables  were created  by the
author, and consist  of dummy  variables  assessed  annually  for political  instability,  civil war, and
international  war.  Further details about data sources and variable  definitions  are provided  in the
endnote.'4  The countries  in the sample  are non-Communist  developing  countries  with a population  of
over 2 million  for which  there are data in the World  Table.  It i  important  to note  that some  of the-9  -
countries involved in international  wars - e.g., Iran and Iraq - have nkot  provided data to the Nol
Table,  and thus are not in the sample.
D.  Results
The,  RelationshjD  BDetween  Milex  andg  EconomicGrow.  The 'cross-section"  regressions  for the
full sample  of 71 countries  show the predicted  non-linear  relationship  between  military spending  and the
growth rate, with a statistically  significant  positive coefficient for MES and a statisdcally significant
negative coefficient for MES2.  These results which constitute  the basic regressions  for the study are
presented in Table 2. The results are similar for both the seven- and six-year  growth  periods and the two
forms of the growth rate - the growth rate of total GNP (GRl),  and the growth rate of GNP excluding
military expenditures. For the differences  regressions that test the 'dme-series' relationship  between a
change in  MMIS  and the change in the growth rate, the coefficients show the predicted non-linear
relationship  in three of the four cases (see Table 3).  The mnmerical  values of the coefficients  for MES
and MES2 predict hat increaes- in milex are associated  with faster growth up to 4 -9 percent of GNP
(depending  on which regression one uses) and with slower growth thereafter.  In view of the lack of
robustness  of any precise coefficient,  no particular  importance  is attached  to the implied  point  of m --imal
growth.
Other RWe&ressor.  The results for neighborig countries' military  expenditures  (NMES)  are quite
unexpected. The coefficients  for NNMES  are positive and statistically  significant  for all the full sample
regressions, the ASMENASE  region, and in most of the regressions where regions and outliers are
dropped.  As discussed further below, this appears to be due to more efficient policies induced by
countries facing external threats.  In the regressions  for the SSA and Latin Ameica  regions, NMES is
not statistically  significant. The results for the other regressors are discussed in the endnote.U
Sensitivity ADalvss.  The results for the full sample support the hypothesis of a non-linear
relationship  between milex and growth. However,  the question  arises whether  these results are sensitive- 10-
to changes  in the specification  (e.g., inclusion/exclusion  of other regressors)  and the sample of countries
in the data set.
Changing  the Specification. Further analysis showed that the results for the full sample of 71
countries are not sensitive to the inclusion  or exclusion  of other explanatory  variables besides MES,
MES2, and NMES.  Speciffcally,  cross section seven-year growth rate regressions with GRT as the
dependent  variable  were repeated removing  successively  NMES, PI, DEBT, OILS  and CTOT, PCP and
GRW. The predicted  quadratic  relationship  remains  as the other regressors  are removed. The predicted
relationship  also generally  holds for the differences  regressions  when  the only regressors  are the ch&ges
in MES and MES2. 16 The results are also not sensitive  to the addition  of other explanatory  variables,
such as  investment, central government expenditure, education, and components of the balance of
payments.
kobustness.  While the full sample results are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion  of other
regressors in the regression equation,  the results are sensitive  to changes  in the countries  in the sample.
In particular, the results by the three geographic  regions outlined earlier (atin  America, Sub-Saharan
Africa  and Asia/Middle  East/North  Africa/Southern  Europe -ASMENASE)  are mixed. Table 4 presents
summary statistics for  regression equations for  each of the  three geographic regions.  For  the
ASMENASE  region (Panel A, Table 4), we find the statistically  significant  quadratic  relationship  in all
cases (regressions  2 and 4). However,  Latin America  (Panel  B, Table 4) shows  no statistically  significant
relationship between MES and the growth rate.  Sub-Saharan Africa does not have the quadratic
relationship  and shows a weak tendency towards a simple  linear positive relationship  between MES and
the growth rate for the six-year growth periods (regressions  1 and 3).
This suggests  that the foil sample  results are being  driven by the ASMENASE  region.  In Table
5, the regions are successively  dropped from the sample. The results show that a significant,  non-linear
quadratic  relationship  holds when Sub-Saharan  Africa  or Latin America are dropped from the fill sample- 11 -
(regressions  4 and 5).  However, when the entire ASMENASE  region is dropped, the coefficients  for
MES and MES2 become totally Insignificant  (regression 6).  When either the Asia or the rest of the
ASMENASE  region is dropped, the non-linear  relationship  exists but one of the coefficients  is no longer
significant  at the 10 percent level.
Based on the above, it would appear that the non-linear relationship  between milex and growth
holds because of  the ASMENASE countries.  Without them,  there is  no  statistically significant
relationship.  Ihe  ASMENASE  region is generally one of higher military spending and more rapid
growth, while Latin America and SSA are, in general, regions of slower growth and lower military
spending.
This conclusion  can be interpreted  in two ways:  the non-linear relationship  only holds for the
ASMENASE  region, or the results  from these countries  are the important  ones. The second interpretation
would  be based on the following  arguments. The  24 countries  for ASMENASE  constitute  more than one-
third of all the observations,  and contain the majority of the population in the total sample.  The view
that Eurasia/North  Africa  is the real test of the hypothesis  is strengthened  if one considers  some particular
features  of Latin America and Sub-Saharan  Africa. Latin American  countries  do not, by and large, face
significant  threats from one another, and protection  has effectively  been provided by the United States.
As a result, it can be conjectured that levels of military spending are generally too low to exhibit a
quadratic relationship. In Sub-Saharan  Africa, in countries  not in an actual war, we observe relatively
low levels of MES due to the combination  of low per capita  product and small size (see Hewitt, 1991b).
Thus SSA is at the left end of the inverted  U relationship,  and exhibits some tendency towards a simple
positive relationshir ',etween milex and growth rajer  than a quadratic  one. 17 By this reasoning, SSA
and Latin America do not reject the hypothesis;  they simply do not test it adequately.
Robustness  vis-a-vis Oudiers.  We further tested the sensitivity  of the results by looking at the
impact  of outliers. The extreme  - highest  and lowest - observations  by growth rates (GRT), per capita- 12  -
product (PCP), neighbor's military expenditure (NMES), and own military expenditure (MES) were
dropped  and regresslome  run without  these observations. When the two top and bottom  outliers by ORT
or MES are dropped, the same  non-linear  relationship  as the full sample  holds, with only small re'uctions
in significance  levels for some of the regressions. Dropping the 10 highest and lowest outliers by per
capita  product and NMES also does not change  the non-linear  relationship. However, if we drop the 10
outliers by growth rates and MES, the hypothesized  relationship  does not always  hold.  In sum, dropping
individual  outlier observations  leads to a conclusion  similar  to dropping regions. A few extreme  outlier
observations  are not producing  the fill sample  results, but a subset of observations  are.
Additional, but less rigorous, information  is provided  by Fiare  2 on the next page.  It plots the
mean MES against the annual growth rate of per capita GNP from 1970-89  for seven regions: South
Europe, North Africa, Middle  East (minus  Saudi Arabia), South  Asia, East  Asia, Sub-Saharan  Africa  and
Latin America. The plot shows a wn-linear relationship  with the growth rate by regions increasing  with
MES up to roughly 4 percent and then decreasing.
In  =m, for the full sample  of 71 countries, we find a significant,  non-linear  relationship  between
milex and the growth rate.  The coefficients  of MES and MES2 indicate  that the change from a positive
to a negative relationship  between  growth and MES comes when MES is between 4% and 9% of GNP,
depending  on which regression one uses. However, this result is being driven  by the 24 countries  in the
sample from Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Southern  Europe, and the specific  coefficients  are
not robust.  When the regressions  are run without these countries, there is no significant  relationship  -
positive or negative  - between MES and the growth rate. The only general conclusion  from the growth
regressions  is that there is no evidence  of a negative  relationship  between  milex and growth in peacetime
until the military expenditure  share is quite  high.TL  t-9  1't  v  8Z  9Z  tpz
eotJpv uel  es  qnS  d
.............................  ......................  ...........................................  ......  ..................................  - _
ID
/  ~~~~00  a 0
0
.....................................  ......  ................................  o sDoIJ  V  JON  4
gdoin3  LlnoS
BISV 1983
68-OLSL  S3W UB@" 49UlB6B  dNg 941dut) jed
lo  azeu L4zMOjE  lenuuv
a einln:- 14-
E.  Miltary Expenditures  and Gowth:  Channels  of Inact
In order to  study the channels through which military expenditures affect growth, we add
investment,  education,  and other key variables  to the growth regressions. The test of whether  a variable  -
- e.g.,  education - is an important channel of impact involves three elements:  (1) causality can be
assumed  to run from milex to the variable, not the reverse; (2) there is a significant  (partial)  correlation
between  the variable and the growth rate; and (3) there is a significant  (partial) correlation  between  milex
and the variable. The causality  issue must be determined  independently  of the growth regressions. The
relation  between the proposed channel  of impact and the growth rate is tested by the significance  of its
coefficient  when it is added to the growth regressions. The correlation  between  the proposed channel  of
impact  and milex is tested by the change in the absolute  value and significance  of the milex coefficient
when the "channel  of impact"  variable is added  to the growth regressions. If there is a major change in
the absolute  value of the milex coefficient  (and especially  if the significance  of the milex coefficient  also
changes), and the other two conditions  are met, then the variable is indeed a major channel  of impact  of
milex on growth.
In Table 6, six economic  variables are added  to the growth regressions, first, one at a time and
then four variables together. The variables (all shares in GNP except for ED) are: the investment  share
in GNP -IS; the share of central government  expenditure  - CGES; the weighted  sum of enrollment  rates
at the secondary  and primary levels (see Landau 1986)  -ED; the balance  of trade -BT; official  transferq
received (net) - TRANS; and the "overall  balance" - OB - which is the sum of the balance of trade,
official  transfers, and net long-term  capital  movements. In none of the regressions  - 2 to 9 - do we see
a material change in the coefficients  for MES and MES2 from those in regression 1.  These results
suggest that none of these variables is an important  channel of impact  of milex on growth.- 15 
Our basic  hypothesis  is that milex should  impact  growth  through resource  use, increased  security,
and increased efficiency  of govermnent  policies. The results in Table 6 do not support the resource use
or increased  security explanation,  though it is possible the two are canceling  each other out.  The results
of testing the efficiency  hypothesis  are in Table 7.
We do not have a direct measure  of efficiency. However, we can use the ratio of output increase
to  investment in physical capital as a proxy measure.  We measure the ratio of output increase to
investment  by IOCR - 'incremental  output capital ratio'.  The numerator in IOCR is the mean annual
increase in real GNP over the 7 years of the growth rate.  The denominator is mean annual real
investment over the 3 years of the lagged regressors.  The higher the ratio of output increase to
investment  in physical capital, ceteris paribus, the greater the efficiency.
In Panel A of Table 7, we use the full set of regressors, and in Panel B, only MES, MES2, and
NMES.  Regression 1 in Panel A is the base regression for comparison;  in regression 2, IOCR is added
to the base regression. The coefficient  for IOCR is highly significant  and the coefficients  for MES and
MES2  decrease markedly  in absolute  value, but their significance  does not change. The same  test is done
in regressions 1 and 2 of Panel B.  Here, when IOCR is added in regression 2,  not only do the
coefficients  of MES and MES2 change, they also become statistically  insignificant.
These results suggest that an important channel of impact of milex on growth is increased
efficiency. This is consistent  with our hypothesis  that governments  which feel threatened  tend to increase
the efficiency  of their economic  policies to build the tax base to finance a larger armed forces.
Table 7 also tests whether the positive impact of NMES on the growth rate is due to greater
efficiency  - in response  to the threat.  This is tested in regressions 1 and 2 of Panel A and regressions
4 and 5 of Panel B.  In both cases, when IOCR is added to the regression, the absolute  value and the
significance  of the NMES coefficient  decrease markedly."'- 16 -
To summarize  our results  on the channels  of the growth  impact  of milex, we find empirical
evidence  that  increased  milex  is associated  with  greater  efficiency  in the developing  countries. We do
not find significant  impact  of milex  through  the levels of investment,  education  or the balance  of
payments.
IV. OTHER  ECONOMIC  IMPACTS  OF MILITARY  EXPENDrTURES
Military  expenditure  is thought  to hurt  economic  variables  beyond  growth. One  frequent  concern
is that increased  milex  crowds  out government  social and infrastructure  spending. Other economic
variables  believed  to be negatively  affected  by military  spending  are the inflation  rate, investment,  and
the balance  of payments.  The  paper  also  analyzes  the impact  of military  expenditures  on these  variables.
A.  Ipac  on Government  Social  and  Infrastucture  Spendin.
Resources  used for the military cannot be used for education,  health or  infrastructure.
Accordingly,  it would  appear  that milex  must  have  an opporunity  cost  of less spending  on these  three
categories  which  both  contribute  to growth  and  poverty  alleviation. 1 9 Data  from  the IMF's Government
Financial  Statistics  were  used  to test this  hypothesis.'
The results  are shown  in Table  8, and are of two types: (i) the government  expenditure  shares
in GDP  regressed  on the share  of milex  in GDP;  and  (ii)  government  expenditure  category  shares  in total
(central)  government  expenditure  regressed  on the share  of milex  in GDP. The share  of exenditure
categories  in GDP  more clearly  indicates  the impact  of milex  on the overall  level  of funding  for other
public  services.
The most  important  result  (regression  1, Table  8) is the positive  relationship  between  the share
of central  government  expenditure  in GDP and the share of milex in GDP.  The coefficients  are
statistically  significant  and numerically  large.  The coefficients  imply that an increase  in milex is- 17 -
accommodated  by an increase in total government  expenditure  - a 1 percent increase in the milex GDP
share would be associated with a 2 percent increase in the government  expenditure  share in GDP.
Table 8 also shows  that the coefficients  for the Impact  of milex on the GDP share of education,
health, combined  education  and health, and infrastructure  are all positive, except for the three-year  health
share.  However, only the  regression of the education share shows a  statistically significant and
numerically important coefficient, and that only for the three-year  period.  Thus, for the full sample,
increased military expenditures as a share of r-DP does not cause major changes in the shares of
education, health or infrastructure  expenditure  in GDP.  Separate regressions were also run for Latin
America and Sub-Saharan  Africa  only. While the results for total government  expenditure  and for health
expenditure  were similar to those for the full sample, the coefficients  for education and infrastructure
were positive and statistically significant. 21 For the sub-sample  of Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa, therefore, increased  military spending is associated with increased  government expenditure  (as
a percent of GDP) on both education  and infrastructure.
When the dependent variables are the shares of the various expenditure categories (e.g.,
education, health) in total government expenditures, all coefficients  but one are negative, statistically
significant  and numerically  important. When  milex is increased, its share in total government  expenditure
increases and the shares of other types of expenditures  are reduced.
In I=,  increased milex does not reduce expenditure  on education,  health, and infrastructure  as
shares of GDP in developing  countries  in general.  For Latin America and Sub-Saharan  Africa alone, it
actally  increases government spending on education and infrastructure. When milex increases, the
shares of these  three categories  in government  expenditure  fall, but total government  expenditure  expands
sufficiently  to keep their shares in GDIP  from falling.  Again, as with economic growth, there is no
evidence  of a general negative imnpact  from military spending in the developing  countries.- 18 -
B.  Inaft  onhrEsZarW  Viables.
The impact  of milex  on other key economic  variables  was also tested. Inflation,  investment,
education,  and  other key  variables  were regressed  on MES  and the other  regressors  used  in the growth
equations.  No claim  is made  that  this  is the correct  spucification  of the determinants  of these  variables.
Rather,  we are  merely  looking  at the impact  of MES  on them,  holding  constant  the  other  factors  included
in the growth regressions. These same regressions  were also run using MES and MES2; in the
regressions  which Included  MES2, none of the coefficients  for either MES or MES2 as statistically
signiflcant. Therefore,  these  regressions  are not discussed  here.
Table  9 shows  the regression  res"lts, and  the findings  are summarized  below:
*  Inflation.  Military expenJiture - as measured by MES - does not have a statistically
significant  impact  on the inflation  rate (INF).
*  Education. The weighted  sum of enrollment  rates  at the primary  and secondary  level
(ED)  was used as an 'output' measure  of education  (see  Landau  1986)  as contrasted  to
the 'input' measure  of government  expenditure  (see  above). The coefficient  for MES  in
the equation  for ED is insignificant.
*  Investment.  The coefficient  for MES  in the equation  for the share  of investment  in GNP
(IS) is negative,  but statistically  insignificant.  This suggests  any impact  of increased
military  expenditure  on the overall  level  of investment  is weak.
3  Balance  of Trade. In the equation  for the balance  of trade as a share  of GNP  (BT),  the
coefficient  for MES  is negative  but not  quite  significant.  An increase  in the milex  share
in GNP  may  worsen  the balance  of trade.
*  Official  Transfers. The equation  for net official  transfers  in GNP  (TRANS),  shows  that
increased  military expenditure  is associated  with  increased  receipt  of transfers.
*  Overall  Balance.  The final  variable  was a proxy  for the 'over all  balance'  on current  and
capital  accounts.  It is  the sum  of the  balance  of trade,  official  transfers,  and  net  long  term
capital  flows  as a share  of GNP. The coefficient  for MES  is negative  but statistically
insignificant.
To  summarize,  with  inflation,  investment,  education,  and  the  balance  of  payments,  as  with  growth
and  government  social  spending,  there  is no evidence  of a strong  negative  impact  from  military  spending
in the developing  countries.- 19  -
V. DEiTEMINANTS  OF MlLITARY  EXPENDTIURE
The desirability  of reducing  military  spending  depends  not  only on its economic  effect  but also
on what motivates  miliary spending. Undetanig  the motivation  also helps shed light on the
feasibiy,  scope  and  limits  of reducing  militay spending.  We cannot  study  the motivations  for military
expendi  directly. However,  we can study  what empirically  measurable  factors  appear  to influence
the level of spending. The most comprehensive  work on the ddminas  of military  spending  is by
Hewitt  (1991a,  1991b). In this paper, we introduce  some  additonal  variables  (e.g., NMES,  political
instablity)  which  pwvide  new  and significant  results.
Table  10  preset  the raults of our regressions  of the share  of milary spending  in GNP  (MES)
on key  _.  be  variables  in the regressions  are  three-  and  five-year  averages.  Our  prors were
that  neios  mitary spending  (NMES),  political  instability  (PO),  civil  war  (CW),  and  int  tiona war
would mcrease  miliry  spending,  as would  transfers  (FRANS).22
As sem from Table 10, the most importa  determinat of MES  is NMES. The coeffici  is
posive, hihly si  an  nd nmeically iponu  Specifically,  a 1 percent  cee  in the averge
of NMES  is associated  with ougy  a 0.5 pecent icrease in MES. The rc_eatip  betwee NMES
and MES  is presumably  threat  response,  with a high level  of military  eq  endi  by one's ndghbors
bemg  eilher  a direct  threat  or a repne  to a threat  by a large, more  distant  country. In either  case,  the
increase  in the given  coouy's  MES  in response  to a higher  NMES  coud be quite  ratonal.
Among  oher  variables,  rasfe  unexectedy have no signfica  impact.'  Inatial
wam,  of couas, increa  the ratio  of milex  to GNP. The IW regess  is a dummy  variable. For the
five-yea  averages,  the  coeffiients  predict  that  the  exstec  of a war  inrees  MES  by  round  3 percen
of GNP. lhe  military  expendi  share is aLso  an incrasing functo  of per capita  product.25  One
definitely  supisin  result  iatMES  is sigficanldy  negatvely  reled  to political  intabit  (PI). Thi
relt  could be explai  by the obseraton  tat  large milary  exenditu  are Ar  sophistcated- 20 -
weapons,  which are used for international  war rather than internal  instability  or for controlling  dissatisfied
civilians.26
Overall, the results suggest that a major determinant of levels of military spending is external
threats as measured  by NMES.  These results suggest  that for individual  countries, military spending is
rationally  motivated  by foreign threats. Such a conclusion  is what an economist  should  expect, given  that
economics  is built on the assumption  that people  are rational  with regard  to their expenditures. However,
much of  the literature assumes military expenditure in  the developing countries is not  rationally
motivated. The threat response  nature of military  expenditure  also implies  that while a country  can lower
its military expenditures  ifits neighbors do so as well, regional conciliation  and disarmament  might be
important  preconditions  for reductions  in military spending.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of our research  was to analyze  the economic  impact  of military expenditures. This
entailed reviewing trends in military spending across regions and over time, analyzing  the impact of
military expenditures  on economic  growth as well as the channels  through which this impact  takes place,
identifying the impact of military expenditures on other key economic variables, and analyzing the
determinants  of military spending. The key conclusions  are summarized  below.
*  Levels of Military  Spending. The share of military  spending in GNP has been generally
falling, including  in the high spending  areas of the Middle  East and North Africa.  The
regions with the most serious econcmic problems - Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America - spend relatively  low shares of GNP on the military.
*  The Impact of Military Expenditures  on Economic  Growth.  For the full sample of 71
countries, our hypothesis of a quadratic milex-growth  relationship  was supported.  As- 21 -
military spending increases, the growth rate at  first increases and then decreases.
However, this result was  being driven  by 24 countries  in the Eurasia/North  Africa region
accounting  for a third of our observations;  these  countries  have relatively  high milex and
high growth. When  these regions are dropped  from the sample, we find no relationship  -
-positive  or negative  - between  milex and growth. From these results, we conclude  that
there is no evidence  of a negative  relationship  between  the level of military spending  and
the growth rate, but it is uncertain if in general there is a non-linear relationship  with
growth initially increasing  and then decreasing  as milex increases.
0  Channels  of Impact of Milex on Economic  Growth. We found empirical evidence  that
increased milex is associated with greater efficiency in the developing countries. The
particular caannel appears to be  external threat (as measured by neighbor's military
expenditures)  which induces increased  military expenditures  and also greater efficiency
to produce  a stronger economy  which can support  the required spending. We do not find
significant  impact of milex through the levels of investment, education,  or the balance
of payments.
*  Other Economic Iimpacts  of Milex.  Total government spending as a share of GNP
increases with MES.  As  a result, with an increase in milex, the GNP shares of
education, health and infrastructure  spending do not decrease even though their shares
in total government  spending  decrease.  Consequently,  as with economic  growth, there
is no evidence of a negative impact of milex on government social and infrastructure
spending.  There is no strong or consistent impact of increased milex on other key
economic  variables;  however, there is some evidence  of a weak negative  impact  of milex- 22 -
on investment and the balance of payments while there is no statistically significant
evidence  of impact  on education  or the inflation  rate.
*  Determinants  of Military Spending. The most statistically  significant  and numerically
important  determinant  of military  spending  is neighbor's military  spending. Neighboring
country's military spending  represents  either a direct threat to any country  or a response
to a larger, more distant threat.  In general, this implies:  1) that military spending by
individual  countries  is rationally  motivated; 2) that regional  conciliation  and disarmament
may be more important  in determining  the feasibility  of unilateral reductions  in military
spending. Other significant  determinants  of military  spending  were per capita income  and
nternational  wars.
The concern about  military spending  in the developing  countries  starts from the hypotheses  that:
1) there is high and rising burden of military expenditure  on the developing  countries; 2) such spending
is not rationally  motivated;  3) the developing  country  military  spending  has a negative  impact  on growth,
government social spending, and other key economic variables.  We find that all three of these
assumptions  are inconsistent with the data.  Developing-country  military spending is:  moderate and
falling, apparently motivated by external threats, and at typical current levels (about 4%),  is not
associated  with lower rates of economic  growth, government  social  and infrastructure  spending,  or other
economic  variables.
As with all studies of the determinants  of growth, this study is constrained to work from an
incomplete  theoretical  basis, using proxies for some explanatory  factors and using imperfect  data.  In
addition, these particular findings apply to peacetime  military spending in the developing countries  and
are based on the years studied. War is an economic  as well as human disaster. With the changes  in the-23  -
world  in the 1990s,  the  relationship  between  developing  countries'  military  spending  and  their  economies
could  also  change.-24 -
Eam
1.  In a paper presented at the World Bank Anua  Conference  on Development  Economics, Robert
McNamara  endorsed a proposal made by the Independent  Group on Financial  Flows to Developing
Countries  (chaired by Helmut Schmidt)  that 'when decisions  concrning allocations  of foreign aid are
made, special consideration  be given  to countries spending  less than 2 percent of their GNP in the
security sector."  Dennis Healey, the former British  defense secretary, was quoted in the Financial
[iM  (July 12, 1991) as advocating  07  nations  to link aid to developing  countries to cuts in defense
expenditures.
2.  World Bankl, Military Expenditures."  Report No. SecM91-1563  (December 1991). Washington,
D. C.
3.  The regional (and full sample) means are unweighted  averages of the country MESs.  There do
not appear to be any unambiguously  superior weighing  mechanisms;  consequendy,  only unweighted
averages  have been presented.
4.  However, it is important  to note that Iraq and Iran are not in the sample.
S.  1  1988, Saudi Arabia was spending 19.8 -ercent of GNP on the military compared with 8.4
percat  in 1969. Honduras experienced  a very rapid increase in MES from 2.8 percent in 1982 to
8.4 percent in 1989. Zimbabwe  was spending  7.9 percent of GNP on the military in 1989 compared
to 3.2 percent by Southern Rhodesia  in 1969. However, these are the exceptions. The more typical
trend is of a reduction in military expenditures  over time.  Egypt, which had reached 36.5 percent of
GNP in 1974  was down to 4.5 percent in 1989. Israel was down from 34 percent of GNP in 1973
and 25 percent in 1981  to 9.2 percent in 1989.
6.  Some researchers  of the relationship  between military spending  and economic  growth attribute
significant  creation of human  capital to the armed services. There are problems with this hypothesis.
First, looking at the numbers in the armed forces in most developing  countries, it is implausible  that
the human capital created during military service would significantly  change the growth of the civilian
economy. It must also be remembered  that significant  numbers of the more highly trained soldiers
are career soldiers whose training does not aid the civilian economy.
7.  If threatened  governments  modify their policies in ways which promote growth, what pattern of
policy change would we expect to see in seriously threatened countries? The necessary  policy
approach  to encourage  rapid growth is quite well spelled  out in the World Dvelopmnt  K  (1991)
in terms of aiding the efficiency  of markets, rather than replacing  them, and flexible  pragmatic
policies.
Historically,  we find re 4ence that at key points in their modernization,  and under conditions
of serious external  threats, Japad and the countries of Western and Central Europe made these
changes in their policies. The political scientist Pempel (1982) describes  the policies which Japan
used to became  a developed country  before World War Two:
"When  Japan was forced to open to Western commerce  in 1854, it had to overcome a 250
year history of centralized  feudalism.... The Meiji reformers realized that a strong state
apparatus, parallel to that of Prussia, was essential  if Japan was to develop the "rich country- 25 -
and strong army" designed  to preserve national  autonomy  from the threat of Western
Imperialism..  .(emphasis  added, p. 12).
Where the prewar Japanese  state was most different from totalitarian  states was in its
toleration, even actual encouragement,  of the private sphere. State institutions,  while
powerful, were not comprehensive  in their activities.... Unlike Sweden,  however, Japan did
not develop a widespread  public system of social services. Although the government
supported a public system of ... education,  private systems developed  parallel and in
competition  with the state.(p. 14).
Private initiative  rather than government  direction; selective  government intervention  or
direction rather than constant  presence; and a small and efficient  government rather than a
lumbering bureaucratic  monstrosity  tended to characterize  Japanese  politics (emphasis  added,
p. 21)."
Imperial  Japan consciously  followed  the pattern of helping rather than fighting the market in
order to build a strong economy  as the basis for a strong army which it believed was needed for
defense.
Eric Jones (1987) describes  how Europe got the market economy  first in his book Ih.
Erean  Miracl,.  He wrote:
Rulers, whose schemes  for glory drove them to prepare for war, began to do so by
actively improving  the economic  base.  In addition there were clients for
modernization  among  the 'middle' and merchant  classes. What they prayed for was
more public order and fewer obstructions  to business, ranging from the abolition  of
legal and customary  restrictions  on factor mobility  to the removal of nuisances  like
narrow town gates and constricting  walls. They desired the enforcement  at law of
freely negotiated  contracts, the improvement  of communications,  and all measures to
unify the market. The wishes of the ruler and of rising group in society were thus in
many ways confluent. Internal barriers to trade began to be  removed, both
institutional  and physical  ones (p. 135).
Thus like Japan in the first half of the 20th century, or Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand
since World War Two, the rulers of modernizing  Europe were forced to facilitate  the efficient
working of a market economy  to build the tax base for their armies.
The explanation  for any  positive association  between  military spending  and economic  growth
is not specific policies.  Rather it is the pattern of policies - spending, regulatory, etc. - which aided
the growth of the market economy  rather than hindering it (as is typical in so many LDCs). When the
governments  of LDCs have felt the need to spend large sums on the armed forces they typically - but
not in every case - also have felt the need to facilitate  the smoother  functioning  of the market
economy (in order to build a tax base which could finance the military spending). Military spending
does not in itself contribute  to faster growth; rather, the policy changes  made along with the increased
military spending accelerate  economy  growth.  Such positive  policy changes  can offset only so much
resource use by the armed forces, therefore, beyond a certain percentage  of GNP, the impact of
increased military spending  turns negative.- 26 -
8.  The best way to measure  the threat from naighbors' military expenditure  seems to be NMES, the
average of their MES's. There  is also some evidence  that countries  respond to threats in terms of
shares of GNP spent rather than dollar values (McKinlay,  1989, Thkir Wozld Militak Eendi  )
One could find rationales  for this response  pattern in terms of smaller countries indicating  a
willingness  to fight and thus inflict costs on a larger country, but they are unable to match
expenditures  in dollar terms. Furthermore, if the smaller country is not technologically  superior, and
thus unable to  substitute  quality of arms for quantity  of armed men, diminishing returns may set in
fairly soon if the smaller country  tried to  substitute  capital for labor. Whatever  theoretical  qualms
one  might have about NMES, it works very well both in the growth regressions and in the
regressions of the determinants  of MES,  Table 10. In contrast to the success of NMES, if we
measure the foreign threat as the ratio of foreign military expenditure  to home country GNP. the
variable is insigmificant.  The sample is 71 non-Communist  LDCs with over two million p,,  .lation
for which the 1990/91 World Tablea (World  Bank) has  data. China was also tried as an addition  to
the sample set of 71  countries, but this changed  nothing. Some of the neighbors of  countries in the
sample are over two million  population, but are not in the sample either because they are not LDCs,
they were  communist,  or the World Tabes do not have data for them - Iran  and Iraq for example.
The source for MES - SIPR[ Yearbook  of  World Armaments  and Disarmament  - had data on most of
these countries so they could be included  in the calculation  of average neighbor's MES - NMES. A
secondary  source - U.S. Arms Control &  Disarmament  Agency, World Milit  ExIenditures and
Arms Transfers allowed  filling in a few more.
9.  Ihe  exogenous  and predetermined  variables included in the regressions  were chosen because they
could  be expected  to influence  the growth rate significantly  and they are available. The expectation
that they would significantly  influence  the growth rate comes  from general theoretical considerations
and the literature on growth, especially  the author's previous work on the empirical  determinants  of
growth (Landau 1986, 1990). Ihe  growth rate of the developed - OECD - countries (GRW) could
influence  the growth rate of the LDCs in terms of the export opportunities  and perhaps also the
amount of foreign investment.  The change in the terms of trade (CTOT) would influence  the returns
to an LDC from any given level of exports. The share of oil exports in GNP (OILS) was included
because many workers in the field believe  major oil exporters can increase MES without  a negative
impact on growth (Looney).
Per capita  product (PCP) is included  because  of the results in the author's previous work.
Allowing  for the level of investment in human capital, there is a strong negative relationship  between
the level of per capita  product and the growth rate. There is of course an enormous literature
suggesting  that debt burdens will slow economic  growth both due to the direct impact  of the debt
service payments  and the indirect threat of inflationary  or other disruptive government  policies if the
burden becomes economically  or politically  unsustainable.  Thus the literature predicts a strong
negative  relationship  between the ratio of debt to GNP (DEBTS)  and the growth rate. Life expectancy
at birth (LIFE) is a proxy for the general level of investment  in human capital.
GRW and CTOT are not hypothesized  to be basic determinants  of long run growth, rather
they serve to remove some of the transitory effects on realized levels of production  of external
conditions.  For this reason, they are mean values over the same years as the dependant  variable, not
lagged.
As indicated  above, some of the limited number  of regressor we have are proxies for the
arguments in equation 1. OILS - the share oil exrorts in GNP - is a proxy for natural resources.  We
tried the population  growth rate, which is a proxy for the growth of the labor force, but it was
insignificant.  LIFE - life expectancy  - is a proxy for the general level of investment  in human capital.
It is better proxy than education  measures.  The two most important  forms of investment  in human- 27 -
capital - health and education  - are highly correlated, so there is a need to choose one or the other
(see Table 7, Panel B). Current levels of investment  in education -like enrollment  rates - could  be
influenced  by the current level of MES, where as LIFE would not be influenced  by current MES.
The other regressors used would be in the reduced form equation influencing  a number of the
proximate  determinants  of growth. PCP - per capita  product - may influence  the rate of technological
change. Lower per capita product countries face a larger 'shelf'  of borrowable  technologies  than
higher per capita  product countries, provided  they make the necessary investments  in human capital.
DEBTS  - the ratio of debt to national product - will influence  investment  levels, and probably also
efficiency  - investors would tend to choose more inflation  safe assets as debt levels rise. We would
expect the political variables - MES, NMES, PI, CW, & IW - to have an impact  on a number of the
proximate determinants  of growth. The military expenditure  regressors  have already been discussed.
Political instability, civil wars, and international  wars would influence  investment,  efficiency,
technological  change, etc. The political instability  dummy - PI - is the only one of the 3 political
conditions  variables which turned out to be statistically  significant  in the growth regressions.
Other possible regressors, besides those mentioned,  were seen as potentially endogenous  and
thus including  them in the basic estimate  of the MES impact would  produce biased estimates.  For
example, if an increase in military expenditure  results in a decrease in the level of investment,  then
including investment  in the basic regressions  would bias our coefficient  of MES upward. The reader
should keep in mind that our purpose here is not to
'explain' economic  growth, but rather to estimate  the impact  of military expenditure  on economic
growth. We are intentionally  omitting  from the basic regressions  factors which would be influenced
either directly by the level of MES, or indirectly  by the policy changes induced  by the threat which
produced a higher level of MES.
10.  A secondary  benefit of lagged regressors is that it avoids contemporary  correlation  between the
explanatory  variables and the residual which would necessitate  a simultaneous  equation system. The
appropriate  variables for a simultaneous  equation system are far from clear theoretically.  In addition,
the data to estimate a good simultaneous  system ior the relationship  between
military spending and economic  growth in the LDCs is simply not available.
11.  The regressions  were also run for shorter growth periods - 5 & 4 years  - and different starting
and ending years within the 1969-89  period. These results generally  are consistent  with those
presented in this report, however, as expected,  the hypothesis fits longer growth periods better than
shorter ones. These other results are available  from the author.
12.  Thus for 7 year growth rates, the difference  in growth rates is the difference  between the growti
rate from year  't' to year 't+6'  and the growth rate from year 't-7' to year 't-l'.  For the lagged
regressors, their differences would be the difference  between their mean for years 't-3' to 't-1' and
their mean for the years 't-10' to 't-8'.
13.  One reviewer of an earlier version of the paper raised the
question, why didn't we use a fixed effects - country  dummy
model? Since most of the variation in growth and milex is cross
sectional,  using country intercepts  almost guarantees  a finding
of minor - or no - effects for milex irrespective  of the true
relationship. Country dummies will capture the effects of cross- 28 -
section differences in milex along with most other cross section
differences.
14.  The assessment  to define the political conditions  variables was done by the author using the
capsule political summaries  for the post World War Two period in The Europe Year Book 1990 (two
volumes).  These summaries  run 5 - 10 normal sized pages per country. Occasionally  The Poliical
Handbook  of the World (1989) was used as a supplemental  source. The following  definitions  were
used. A time period for country 'Xi was considered  one of political instability  if there were coupes,
attempted coupes, violent riots - dozens or more killed, significant  gueriliA  wa-fare, or major terrorist
incidents 5 years or less apart. The situation was defined  as one of civil war if regular internal armies
fought, there was major guerilla warfare, or the suppression  of dissent killed thousands  of people -
e.g. the peak of the "Dirty War" in Argentina. The situation  was defined as international  war if the
country fought engagemernts  - with significant  casualties  - with foreign country military forces. For
the civil war and international  war dummies, the situation was defined to exist only for the years
hostilities  were active. The years of civil war and international  war were relatively few, but political
instability, as here defined, existed for some (or all) years for the majority of the countries in the
sample.
The regressors formed from the political dummy variables were also the average of 3 annual
lagged values. The author had to produce his own  political conditions  measures because  there are no
suitable published indexes.  Internal World Bank data on Central Government  Expenditure  - CGE
- for the years 1972-88  - was also used. This CGE series was extended  back to 1969  using the
USACDA data. Where the above sources had missing  values, that usually means an observation  on
that variable is missing. There are two exceptions  to that rule. First, for the lagged regressors, they
are the mean of available years, so that if one year of the three is missing, the value is the mean of
two years. Second, the human capital series - enrollments,  etc. - are generally  not collected for every
year and they would not normally  jump around between collection  dates. These series were
interpolated,  but not extrapolated. No other series were either interpolated  or extrapolated.
15. The coefficients  for PCP - per capita product - have the predicted negative  sign and they are
significant  for the cross section regressions  both on the full sample and the regions (full regional
regression results are available from the author). In the differences  regressions, DPCP has the
predicted sign and is usually statistically  significant,  but the significance  levels are lower than the
cross section regressions (compare Tables 2 and 3).  The negative and significant  coefficients  are
consistent with the findings in Landau (1986) that, holding constant  human capital, their is a 'catch
up'  effect among  the LDCs. That is lower per capita countries  would tend to grow faster if they
invest sufficiently  in human capital. The most plausible  explanation  for the 'catch up effect' is that the
available 'shelf' of borrowable  technologies  is larger for lower per capita income countries.
The human capital regressor is the life expectancy  - LIFE. LIFE has positive and highly
signiflcant  coefficients  in virtually all the  regressions. The ratio of official debt to GNP - DEBTS -
has the expected  negative coefficient  and is highly significant  in most regressions. The results for the
change in terms of trade - CTOT, the share of oils exports in GNP - OILS, and the growth rate of the
OECD countries - GRW - are mixed. Sometimes  the coefficients  have the expected  signs and they are
significant, and sometimes  the coefficients  are insignificant  or the 'wrong' sign.
16.  For the differences regressions with only DMES and DMES2 as explanatory  variables, the
predicted quadratic  holds with DGRT as the dependent  variable and there is a simple positive linear
relationship  with DGRNM as the dependent  variable. These regressions  are not in the Tables with this
report, they are available  from the author.-29  -
17.  If we look at shorter growth periods of five and four years for SSA, the simple  positive linear
relationship  is statistically  significant.
18. In regressions 3 and 6 of Table 7, IS, the share of investment  in GNP is ade-'  to the regressions
which already include IOCR. In these regressions, IS is statistically  significant,  whereas, in regression
2 of Table 6, without  IOCR in the regression, is not statistically  significant.  This result underscores
the importance  of efficiency  of investment.
19.  Developing  country  armed forces do spend funds on education  and health care for the troops as
well as on some infrastructure. However, these exenditures  are not the bulk of military spending.
20.  While the data includes almost  all the 71 countries  already used to test the milex-growth
reladonship, over half of the potendal observations  during the 1970-90  period are missing.  Still,
there are up to 191 three-year observations  and 119 five-year observations,  and regressions were run
using three- and five-year averages of the expenditure  data.
21.  Detailed  regression results are available  from the author.
22.  The major regressors  tested (besides  population  - POP) are per capita  product (PCP), neighbor's
average military expenditure  share (NMES), the dummies  for political instability  (PI, CW and IW),
and the share of official transfers received  in national  product (TRANS). The civil war regressor was
dropped because it proved insignificant. PCP tests whether  richer countries are willing to spend a
higher share of GNP on the military.
23.  Without India (and China), population  is not a statistically  significant  derminant  of MES for the
multi-year  periods.  Regressions  were also run with anmual  observations,  though these are not
reported in the table.  For the anmnal  observations,  population  and population  squared influence  MES;
these are scale effects, but the coefficients  are reversed with and without India. The annual
regressions  were run including  and excluding  India.  India changes  the effects of population  on MES,
but does not change other coefficients  materially. Since India is obviously a population  outdier,  the
muld-year period regressions reported here exclude  India.
24.  However, with annual observations,  TRANS has positive and statistically  significant  coefficients.
25.  In these regressions, PCP is measured in thousands  of 1987 U.S. dollars.  In some of the other
tables and regressions, PCP is in 1987 U.S. dollars.
26.  Janowitz (1977) noted that the developing  countries  experienced  much greater increases  in para-
military forces (militia, political police, etc.) from 1966 to 1974/75  than in active  duty regular forces.
He also discusses  the preference among  military governments  to use para-military  forces rather than
the regular army for internal control.- 30 -
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Variable  Lis
Symbol  Dofinltlon
BT  Balance  of Trade  as shar of GNP
COBS  Share  of cental gov. exp. in GNP
CTOT  annual  % change  terms  of trado,  same  yeas ss ORT
DEBTS  foreign  debt  as share  GNP
ED  Weighted  sum  of enrollment  rates
GRT  annual  growth  rate total  GNP
GRNM  annual  growth  rate GNP  excluding  miliay expehiure
G3RW  anmal growth  rate  OECD  countri,  m  yeas as  ORT
INF  inflation  rate
IOCR  Incremental  Output  Capital  Ratio
Is  Share  of investment  in GNP
IW  dummy  active  war  that  year
LIFE  life expectancy  at birth  in years
MES  military  expenditure  as share  GNP
MES2  MES  squaed
NMES  mean  MMS  neighboring  countries
OB  Sum  balance  trade, capital  account  balanc & trasf  - share  of GNP
OILS  oils exports  as share  of GNP  percent
PCP  Per Capita  Product  in 1987  U.S. $
PI  dummy  variable  for political  Istability
POP  population
TRANS  Official  Transfers  Received  as Shae of GNIP- 33 -
TABLE  1
Patters of Military  Expendintre
Sub-
South  North  Nid  South  Ea  t  Sahara  Latfn  Full  Full
Yeer  Europa  Africa  East  Asfa  ASia  Africa  America  Sple  Ssmple2
1969  5.8  2.4  13.6  1.4  3.0  2.1  1.9  4.2  2.9
1970  4.5  2.6  14.3  2.7  3.5  2.2  1.8  4.3  2.9
1971  4.6  2.7  14.4  3.0  3.8  2.3  1.8  4.4  3.1
1972  3.9  2.7  13.8  3.0  4.0  2.2  1.7  4.4  3.1
1973  3.9  2.8  19.5  2.2  3.7  2.2  1.7  4.7  2.6
1974  4.S  2.9  17.2  2.2  3.5  2.3  1.7  4.5  2.7
1975  4.6  3.7  18.6  2.5  4.8  2.3  2.3  5.1  3.1
1976  4.2  4.8  19.0  2.5  4.4  2.4  2.2  5.3  3.0
197  4.1  ;.t  17.3  2.4  4.4  2.4  2.4  5.1  3.0
1978  4.0  6.3  14.4  2.3  4.3  2.8  2.3  4.9  3.0
1979  3.8  5.7  15.8  2.4  4.0  3.1  2.2  4.9  3.0
1960  3.8  5.2  14.0  2.5  4.3  2.7  2.6  4.7  3.1
1981  4.3  6.3  13.0  2.5  4.5  2.8  3.0  4.9  3.4
1982  4.2  7.3  13.5  2.7  4.5  2.7  3.2  5.2  3.5
1963  4.0  6.6  13.5  2.8  4.2  2.6  2.9  5.0  3.3
1964  4.3  6.4  13.9  2.8  3.9  2.6  2.9  5.0  3.3
1965  4.2  7.1  12.7  3.2  4.0  2.4  2.8  4.9  3.2
1966  3.9  6.4  12.3  3.7  3.9  2.4  2.7  4.8  3.2
1967  3.9  5.8  11.6  3.9  3.7  2.5  2.5  4.6  3.2
1988  3.9  4.9  10.3  3.4  3.7  2.3  2.8  4.3  3.2
1989  4.3  4.6  7.2  3.7  3.5  2.0  2.7  3.9  3.2
Notes:  1.  Regional means  are  simple averoge of  NES  for  countries  In  the  region.
2.  EFull  Saple"  is  the  mean  for  *ll  71 countries  in  the  sampte, "Futl  Sample2" excludes  the
NMddle  East & North Africa.
3.  Panel D:  Countries  in  Regions
Southern  uro:  Greece, Portugal,  Spoin
Algeria,  Libya,  Norocco,  TunSsSa
ffidle  East.  Egypt,  Isreel,  Jord,A,  Saudi Arabia,  Syria,  Turkey
South  Aisi:  Banoladesh, India,  Neptl,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka
East  Asia  Indbnes a,  RepublSc  of  Korea,  Malaysia,  Papua  New  Guinea,
Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand
Sub-Shoran Africo:  lenin,  Burkina  Faso, Burundi,  Coneroon, Central  Africa  Rep.,  Chad,
Cote  D'Olvorie,  Ghano,  Kenya,  Liberia,  Nadagascar,  Malf,  NaIad,
Niger,  Nigeria,  Rwnda,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalfa,  South  Afrfca,
Sudan,  TanzanIa,  Togo,  Ugandb,  Zaire,  Zacb10,  Zifebbe
Laifn  Aemrfa:  Argntina,  Botivia,  8razil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  El
Salvador,  Guateaula,  Haiti,  Hcndura4,  Jmcmcv, Panema,  Paraguay,
Peru,  Uruguay, Venezuela-34 -
TABLE  2
Cross Section Regreuions
Growth ovnr  7  Growth over  6
Year Perfioe  Year Periods
Ro.  No.  1  2  3  4
CRT  GRIIN  ORT  GRN
INT  -13.7  -11.4  -9.28  -9.05
(3.62)  (2.89)  (3.64)  (3.56)
RNU  3.39  2.67  2.30  2.19
(3.49)  (2.65)  (4.0  )  (3.84)
PCP  -0.0012  -.0012  -.0016  -.0015
(3.80)  (3.70)  (4.05)  (3.93)
CTOT  0.63  .067  .039  .040
(1.88)  (1.93)  (1.27)  (1.32)
DEBTS  -0.32  -.032  -0.32  -.033
(3.54)  (3.35)  (2.82)  (2.95)
LIFE  .127  .133  .123  .122
(4.64)  (4.69)  (3.82)  (3.81)
OILS  .060  .060  .114  .116
(1.63)  (1.59)  (2.26)  (2.32)
Pi  -1.00  -1.06  -1.02  -1.04
(2.55)  (2.60)  (2.26)  (2.32)
MIES  3.54  .323  .346  .330
(4.25)  (3.77)  (3.54)  (3.39)
ES  .388  .342  .409  .479
(2.03)  (1.74)  (1.83)  (2.17)
NES2  -.032  -.025  -0.33  -.037
(2.66)  (2.02)  (2.64)  (2.61)
R2  .462  .439  .462  .422
D.F.  110  105  112  111
D.".  2.03  2.00  1.96  1.97- 35 -
TABLE  3
REGRESSIONS  OF THE D  iFFERENCE  IN GROWTH  RATES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE
MULTI-YEAR  PERIODS  ON THE DIFFERENCES  IN THE REGRESSORS
7 Year Growth  Periods  6 Year Growth Periods
Reg. No.  1  2  3  4
DGRT  DGRNM  DGRT  DGRNM
DGRW  .0078  .010  .0088  .010
(3.42)  (3.72)  (5.80)  (5.93)
DPCP  -4.2E-6  -5.4E-6  -6.4E-6  -7.IE-6
(1.57)  (1.80)  (2.29)  (2.37)
DCTOT  .050  .036  .022  .033
(2.49)  (1.71)  (1.30)  (1.84)
DDEBTS  -.038  .040  -.033  -.035
(6.55)  (5.88)  (6.18)  (S.62)
DLIFE  .00059  .00083  .00068  .00079
(2.17)  (2.55)  (2.59)  (2.65)
DOILS  -.033  -.0010  -.092  -.040
(1.00)  (.02)  (2.77)  (1.06)
DPI  -.0026  -.0075  .0011  -.0012
(.74)  (1.92)  (.33)  (.36)
DNMES  .0027  .0023  .0034  .0033
(3.96)  (2.85)  (5.31)  (4.54)
DMES  .0035  .0u36  .0028  .0022
(3.49)  (3.34)  (2.66)  (1.93)
DMES2  -.00012  -7.3E-5  -9.5E-5  -3.0E-5
(3.20)  (1.88)  (2.32)  (.69)
R2  .305  .336  .247  .279
D.F.  272  227  398  352
Note:  Each  variable is the  difference  between  the  multi-year  average  for the current t and the  multi-year
average stang  in  year t-7.  No intercept  is used in the  regresions.  All regressions are GLS -
SAS Proc Autoreg - due to autoregressive  errors.-36 -
Table 4
Summary  of  RegreMions  by  Geographic  Regfons
PANNEL  A: Asia,  Middlo  East.  North  Afrfrs.  and  Southern  Eurog
Seven-year  Growth  Periods  Six-year  Growth  Poriods
Rev.  No.  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4
GRT  GRT  GRN"  GRN  CRT  GRT  GURN  Gam
WNES  .365  .356  .331  .323  .346  .341  .302  .297
(3.33)  (3.79)  (3.06)  (3.35)  (2.95)  (3.17)  (2.61)  (2.87)
8.8  -. 123  .677  -. 035  .674  -.107  .617  -.100  .603
(1.12)  (2.4)  (.33)  (2.39)  (.91)  C1.93)  (.87)  (2.22)
MES5  -. 047  -. 042  .043  -. 046
(3.09)  (2.67)  (2.40)  (2.70)
ma  .346  .517  .318  .456  .329  .440  .273  .424
D.F.  24  23  24  23  24  23  24  23
D.W.  2.01  1.96  1.90  1.90  2.13  2.15  2.03  2.11
PANEL  B: Latin  Amnrica
seven-Mear  (roth  Period  Sfx-year Growth  Periods
Ree.Mo.  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4
CRT  CRT  GRUN  URN  GOT  CRT  GRU  GRN
NNES  S.  .525  .502  .395  .058  .143  .138  .224
(1.18)  (.97)  t.91)  (.67)  (.09)  (.21)  (.21)  (.32)
8.6  .267  -.098  .279  -. 563  .0002  .395  -. 024  .S53
(.83)  (.08)  (.77)  (.42)  (.0001)  (.41)  (.06)  (.40)
NEe5  .060  .133  -. 101  -. 103
(.32)  (.65)  (.43)  (.43)
G2  .424  .402  .352  .335  .410  .391  .375  .355
D.F.  25  24  22  21  26  25  26  25
D.W.  1.81  1.77  2.25  2.17  1.68  1.77  1.68  1.79
PANEL  C: Sub-aharan  Afrfca
Seven-year  Growth  Periods  Six-year  Growth  Periods
Reg.  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4
No.
GRT  GRT  GRlU  GRNR  GRT  GRT  GRNN  GUN
1NE5  -. 114  -. 114  -. 109  -. 111  -. 216  -. 255  -. 114  -. 160
(.50)  (.49)  (.47)  (.47)  (.86)  (.99)  (.43)  (.59)
NE8  .131  .118  .112  .198  .367  .882  .363  .886
(.54)  (.19)  (.46)  (.30)  (1.53)  (1.35)  (1.50)  (1.34)
NE.2  .0018  -. 012  -. 060  -. 061
(.02)  (.14)  (.85)  (.85)
.2  .138  .113  .107  .081  .213  .207  .189  .180
D.F.  36  35  34  33  37  36  36  35
D.V.  2.39  2.39  2.23  2.23  2.17  2.16  2.17  2.17
Notes  For  prestntational  saplicfty,  the  coefffeients  for  other  regrmifons  are  not  ahown for  the  abov
regr  ssfons  n  this  teble.-37-
TABLE  S
DROPPING  VAIOUS REGIOhh
*q.  no.  1  2  3  4  5  6
Full  Drqp  Drop  Drop  Drop  Drop
S"^p  Ast  NE/M/SE  Su  LA  AWE/N
NA/SE
INT  -.136  -.146  *.149  -.106  -.126  -.155
(3.62)  (3.41)  (3.56)  (2.12)  (2.80)  (3.04)
MV  .033  .03S  .03S  .029  .028  .039
(3.49)  (3.40)  (3.34)  (2.57)  (2.47)  (3.12)
PCP  -1.21-5  -1.21-5  -1.3E-5  -1.OE-5  -1.3E-5  -1.4E-S
(3.60)  (3.23)  (3.75)  (3.16)  (2.70)  (3.26)
CTOT  .063  .056  .050  .078  .055  .040
(1.0)  (1.55)  (1.29)  (2.09)  (1.28)  (.94)
OILS  .060  .061  .094  .073  .013  .103
(1.63)  (1.48)  (1.8)  (1.6)  (.30)  (1.70)
DMIT  -.032  -. 029  -.032  -.050  -. 022  -.029
(3.54)  (2.93)  (3.19)  (4.30)  (2.05)  (2.60)
LIFE  .0012  .0012  .0014  .0010  .0014  .0013
C4.63)  (3.75)  (4.63)  (2.24)  (4.36)  (3.65)
PIS  -.010  -.011  -.010  -.006  -.011  -.011
(2.55)  (2.46)  (2.26)  (1.32)  (2.49)  (2.10)
I"E  .003  .0030  .0036  .0035  .0032  .0026
(4.24)  (2.70)  (3.41)  (4.11)  (3.75)  (1.34)
NES  .0030  .0026  .0045  .0061  .0033  .0030
(2.03)  (1.20)  (1.56)  (2.91)  (1.51)  (.87)
ESV  -.00032  -.000Z3  -.00041  -.00045  -.00027  -.00029
(2.46)  (1.74)  (1.61)  (3.60)  (2.10)  (1.01)
Rs  .442  .386  .424  .631  .443  .300
O.F.  110  90  96  64  75  76
D.".  2.03  2.04  2.04  2.10  1.96  2.02- 38 -
TABLE  6
Charnels of lpect
Rg.  o.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
INT  -14.3  -14.0  -14.3  -16.0  -7.3  -13.4  -13.3  -14.0  -15.5
(3.52)  (3.38)  (3.56)  (3.80)  (1.83)  (3.05)  (3.01)  (3.41)  (3.65)
GRU  3.22  3.12  3.31  3.19  3.02  3.02  3.07  3.13  2.93
(3.12)  (2.93)  (3.23)  (3.11)  (2.72)  (2.74)  (2.87)  (2.98)  (2.73)
PCP  *.0013  -.0013  -.0013  -.0013  -.0006  -.0013  -.0013  -.0013  -.0013
(3.82)  (3.81)  (3.77)  (3.79)  (1.98)  (3.84)  (3L84)  L3.94)  (3.79)
CTOT  .068  .069  .073  .062  .082  .068  .066  .068  .068
(.72)  (1.74)  (1.66)  (1.57)  (1.93)  (1.73)  (1.65)  (1.71)  (1.71)
DEST  -.041  -.043  -.033  -.038  -.045  -.038  -.040  -.039  -.031
(4.17)  (3.98)  (3.05)  (3.76)  (4.21)  (3.38)  (4.07)  (3.81)  (2.57)
LIFE  .150  .148  .156  .202  .148  .143  .151  .217
(4.81)  (4.66)  (5.00)  (4.23)  (4.73)  (4.32)  (4.81)  (4.44)
OILS  .066  .062  .075  .066  .043  .060  .063  .061  .061
(1.65)  (1.52)  (1.86)  (1.66)  (1.01)  (1.45)  (1.56)  (1.47)  (1.42)
Pi  -.98  -. 96  -1.07  -.95  -1.14  -1.01  -. 96  -1.00  -1.02
(2.36)  (2.28)  (2.56)  (2.30)  (2.55)  (2.40)  (2.27)  (2.37)  (2.42)
-N-S  .377  .378  .364  .399  .368  .383  .377  .382  .403
(4.27)  (4.2)  (4.15)  (4.48)  (3.82)  (4.29)  (4.27) (4.29)  (4.45)
HIS  .419  .414  .466  .411  .429  .400  .389  .420  .450
(2.13)  (2.10)  (2.36)  (2.10)  (2.02)  (2.00)  (1.90)  (2.13)  (2.28)
NES2  -.034  -.033  -.034  -.033  -.034  -.032  -.031  -.034  -.032
(2.77)  (2.72)  (2.78)  (2.70)  (2.61)  (2.60)  (2.34)  (2.75)  (2.61)
iS  .0093  .020
(.43)  (.91)
COES  -. 038  -. 041
(1.50)  (1.55)
ED  -.0077  .0094  -. 0093





06  .028  .039
(.53)  (.71)
R2  .518  .514  .524  .523  .437  .514  .514  .514  .527
D.F.  94  93  93  93  94  93  93  93  90
D.V.  1.99  1.92  2.00  1.98  1.88  2.09  1.98  2.15  2.09-39  -
TAILE  7
Testfng  the  Efficiency  HNothesie
Pwl  A;  Full  Sot  of  Regreasors, 7 year Growth Rates,  CRT  Dependent  Variable
Reg. No.  1  2  3
DeP. Ver.  CRT  GaT  ORT
INT  -14.2  -5.50  -2.0
(3.71)  (1.92)  (.77)
88W  3.63  1.06  -. 11
(3.71)  (1.43)  (.16)
PCP  -. 0012  -. 0005  -. 0004
(3.79)  (2.14)  (1.91)
CTOT  6.92  2.95  3.43
(1.86)  (1.10)  (1.42)
DEBTS  -3.46  -1.15  -2.07
(3.7,)  (1.65)  (3.18)
LIFE  .124  .072  .047
(4.63)  (3.66)  (2.56)
OILS  6.15  3.78  .01
(1.58)  (1.35)  (.35)
Pi  -. 98  -. 74  -. 52
(2.51)  (2.63)  (2.01)
MIES  .375  .155  .129
(4.47)  (2.43)  (2.24)
iS  .073
(5.10)
IOCR  .078  .092
(10.1)  (12.3)
*N  .358  .258  .223
(1.88)  (1.90)  (1.82)
1U52  -. 031  -. 022  -. 019
(2.6)  (2.60)  (2.45)
12  .497  .743  .7
D.F.  105  104  103
D.W.  2.03  1.90  1.91
Panel  B;  MI, NES2,  MNNU  only,  7  year  Growth  Rates,  ORT  Dependent  Variable
Reg. No.  1  2  3  4  5  6
Dep  Vcr.  CRT  CRT  CRT  ORT  ORT  GRT
INT  2.46  2.12  .. 99  2.56  2.11  1.14
(5.02)  (5.34)  (1.58)  (6.57)  (6.52)  (1.97)
MNEs  .237  .096  .083
(3.11)  (1.48)  (1.29)
IS  .046  .039
(2.32)  (2.03)
IOCR  .040  .043  .039  .042
(8.27)  (8.68)  (8.08)  (8.36)
wNe  .442  .152  .127
(2.52)  (1.04)  (.86)
1132  .0084  -. 0074
-. 020
(2.42)  (1.19)  (1.07)
R2  .032  .364  .385  .061  .371  .385
D.F.  129  128  127  131  130  129
0.1.  2.02  1.54  1.65  2.10  1.58  1.65- 40 -
TABLE  8
Iqect  of  Nflox  On The Lewv  w*d  Co  posItfon  of  Central  Govrrmsnt  Expwnd1ture  1970-89
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  a  9
Dep.  Var.  TOTAL  ED0IC.  EDtUC.  HEALTH  HEALTH  INFRA  INFRA  EO.+HE  ED  + HE
S.GDP  S.GDP  S.G.E  S.GDP  S.G.E.  S.GDP  S.G.E  S.GDP  S.O.E.
3  Year  Averages
INT  .179  .029  .153  .014  .068  .017  .097  .043  .220
(13.3)  (10.0)  (15.7)  (8.93)  (13.0)  (9.24)  (13.1)  (10.9)  (17.3)
DEF.S.GDP  2.00  .100  -.48  -. 026  -. 456  .037  -. 485  .078  -.932
(6.99)  (1.97)  (2.52)  (.78)  (4.11)  (.96)  (3.10)  (1.07)  (3.79)
R2  .199  .015  .027  -. 002  .076  .000  .045  .001  .065
D.F.  191  191  191  191  191  184  184  191  191
S  Year Averages
INT  .186  .030  .152  .014  .069  .015  .088  .045  .221
(12.7)  (10.1)  (15.2)  (8.18)  (12.3)  (7.55)  (11.7)  (10.5)  (16.9)
DEF.S.GDP  1.93  .068  -. 523  .030  -.455  .06S  -. 309  .038  -. 989
(5.46)  (1.04)  (2.28)  (.70)  (3.29)  (1.43)  (1.71)  (.40)  (3.29)
R2  .193  .001  .034  -. 005  .075  .010  .017  -. 008  .076
D.F.  119  119  119  119  119  115  115  119  119-41  -
TABLE  9
lqct  of  NES on Key Economic  Variables
Roo. No.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Dep.Var  INF  ED  CGES  IS  BT  TRANS  08
INT  -.080  47.6  .162  .214  -.105  .023  -.0003
(1.11)  (4.52)  (11.0)  (12.9)  (7.45)  (3.87)  (.03)
ORW  .022  3.61  - .007  -.0004  .014  .0002  .0034
(1.39)  C2.62)  (2.82)  (.15)  C5.22)  (.16)  (1.39)
PCp  .00008  .055  .000037  .000032  .000014  -.00001  .000004
(3.22)  (14.1)  (6.65)  (5.03)  (2.92)  C5.68)  (1.19)
POP  9.5E-11  4E-9  6E-12  -4E-11  1.1E-10  -2.2E-10  -6.6E-1
3
(.43)  (.11)  (.12)  (.65)  (2.24)  (1.07)  (.02)
OILS  .008  145  .227  .258  .131  -.056  .070
c.02)  (2.21)  C2.55)  (2.46)  C1.73)  C1.57)  C1.32)
Pi  .053  8.86  -.014  -.018  .017  .0040  .0032
(1.44)  (1.90)  (1.92)  (2.08)  (2.42)  (1.42)  C.60)
DEBT  .234  47.4  .093  -.022  -. 072  .022  -. 050
(5.47)  (7.36)  (10.7)  (2.07)  (8.99)  (6.57)  (7.82)
NNES  -.0016  5.50  -.0043  - .0006  -.0028  .0005  - .0022
(.22)  (5.58)  (2.93)  (.33)  (2.04)  (.85)  (2.05)
NES  -.0033  .24  .013  -.0013  -.0020  .0015  -.00087
(.48)  (.25)  (8.89)  (.69)  (1.54)  (2.57)  (.85)
R2  .080  .464  .382  .099  .242  .188  .151
D.f.  421  392  408  405  413  421  406
Note:  These regressions  mere also  run  using NES and NES2, that  is  testing  a non-linear  relationship  between
milex  nd these variables.  None  of  the  coefficients  for  NES  or  NES2  were statistically  significant,  so these
regreons  are  not  in  the  table.-42  -
TABLE 10
The  Determinants  of  M$iltary  Expenditure  - HIS
Re-.  1  2  3  4
3  Year  Average  5  Year  Averages
INT  .601  .443  .423  .302





PCP  .557  .603  .640  .648
(7.11)  (7.14)  (6.42)  (6.12)
EMKS  .534  .547  .545  .552
(12.4)  (12.5)  (11.1)  (11.1)
pi  -6.37  -.494  -.541  -.511
(2.51)  (1.91)  (1.50)  (1.42)
IW  2.08  1.93  3.04  2.75
(4.38)  (3.85)  (4.38)  (3.76)
TRANS  .025  .024
(.76)  (.57)
R2  .404  .398  .501  .489
D.P.  465  461  268  265
Notes  All  regressions GLS due to autocorrelation.  For the means, standard
deviations, and unit of variables, see last Table.- 43 -
Annex A
Review  and Critique of Major Existing Studies
The flrst influential  empirical study, which set off a wave of work in reaction, was by Benoit
(1978). He used a sample  of 44 LDCs with available  data from 1950-65. He regressed the growth rate
of civilian product on the shares of military spending, investment, and net bilateral aid in GNP.  His
results were that the 'military burden' had a statistically  insignificant  positive correlation with growth
rates when  all 3 regressors  were included  in the equation,  and a statistically  significant  positive  correlation
when either of the other two regressors was excluded.
Benoit had a decent sized sample, but he did not include any regressors for human capital,
technology, natural resources, or  efficiency in his regressions.  The econometric work may have
simultaneity  problems since he used single  equation OLS regressions with the regressors from the same
multi-year  time period as the dependent  variable. Benoit also has no regressors  for political conditions.
His milex regressor is entered only linearly  and it is unlagged.
Lim (1983) is one of a series of studies done in reaction  to Benoit's results.  Lim used a sample
of 54 LDCs for the years 1965-73, and regressed the estimated - least squares - growth rate over the
period on the mean of the 1965, 70, & 73 values for the incremental  capital output ratio, the share of
military expenditure  in GDP or government  spending, and ratio of capital inflow  to domestic savings.
He found a statistically significant negative relationship  between the share of milex in government
spending for his whole set of 54 countries and most geographic sub-sets.  He found a statistically
insignificant  negative relationship  between milex as a share of GDP and growth for his whole sample,
but the relationship  was statistically  significant  when 8 Middle  East and Southern  European  countries  were
eliminated.
LimWs  work has all the problems of Benoit's (see above) and in addition his sample is only 8
years.
Faini, Annez, & Taylor (1984)  regressed annual changes  in GDP on the growth rate of exports,
the growth rate of population, the change in the share of arms spending in GDP, the change in capital
inflows from abroad, the growth rate of the capital stock, and per capita  product in a fixed effects  model
with 558 annual observations  covering various years between 1952 - 79, from 50 some LDCs.  The
coefficient for the change in military expenditure  share is negative for the LDCs as a whole and the
African & Asian sub-samples  with a "t> 1.5".  (The reporig  of the regression results doa  not include
either standard errors or t values.) t> 1.5 would be significant  at roughly the 7.5% level in a one tailed
test or the 15% level in a two tailed test.
The work by Taylor et. al has the problem that it is measuring  anual  changes  in GDP, not long
run growth.  They tested for simultaneity  problems, but it is not clear about auto-correlation. The
regressors for capital inflow, investment, and exports could be influenced  by the level of milex, so
including  them could  bias the coefficient  for miles.  Political  factors are ignored, and the miles regressor
is linear and unlagged. Robert Looney (frequendy  with P. C. Frederiksen)  has published a nmber  of
empirical studies of the relationship  between miles and economic  growth in the LDCs. However, the
thrust of his work directly on the MEEG issue is summed up in his 1988 book.  Looney works with a-44 -
sample  of 71 LDCs and data for the years 1970-82. He breaks his sample  up into arms producers - 21,
and non-producers  - 50.
For both sub-samples  he regresses the growth rate of real GDP over the whole period on the
growth of investment 1970-81', a regressor for milex, and a variety of other regressors. For tih..  Nms
producers he uses milex in two forms per capita and as a share of GDP.  The investment  regressor is
always included along with a milex regressor and one or more of the following:  the inflation rate,
foreign resource balance, government budgetary  balance, and the share of public consumption  in GDP
(all 1970-82  period averages). For the arms producers, both milex regressors  always yield a statistically
significant  positive coefficient.
For the non-arms producers he uses only the per capita milex regressor and includes with it in
the regressions,  the investment  regressor, and one or more of the following: the inflation  rate, resource
balance, public external debt, public debt service ratio, government budgetary balance, and public
external borrowing coinmitments. For the non-producers  the milex regressor always has a significant
negative  coefficient. All of Looney's results reported in the book are single equation OLS regressions,
thus there may be simultaneity  problems. His other regressors  are mostly  factors likely to be influenced
by the level of milex, especially  averaged  over a 12 year period. Looney  has no regressors  which control
for natural resource endowments,  technology, or human capital.  He has no variables which allow for
political conditions like international  wars, etc., and his milex regressors are only entered linearly and
unlagged.
Biswas  & Ram (1986) did a study of 58 LDCs for the years 1960-77. They broke their sample
down into middle and low income countries,  and separated  the two decades. They regressed the growth
rate on the investment  share, the growth rate of the labor force, the growth of military  expenditure  and/or
the growth rate of military expenditure  times the share of military expenditure  in GDP.  Their milex
coefficients were usually statistically insignificant, however for the full sample and middle income
sub-sample  for the 1970s  decade, the coefficient  for the growth of military expenditure  times its share
in GDP was positive and statistically significant  at the 10% level.  They conclude there is no strong
evidence  for any relationship  positive or negative  between milex and economic  growth.
The Biswas &  Ram study is very limited in the range of influences on growth considered;
technology,  natural resources, human  capital, and external  conditions  are all ignored. No political factors
are considered, and while there are several variations in the form of the milex regressor, a non-linear
relationship  is not tried and the milex regressor is not lagged.
Perhaps the most sophisticated  empirical study of the MEEG relationship in the literature is
Deger's (1986).  The same study, with small modifications  appeared several times earlier since the late
1970s. Deger estimates  by three stage least squares a 4 equation  simultaneous  equation  model for a cross
section of 50 LDCs for the time period 1965-73. The left hand variables in the 4 equations are the
growth rate, the saving rate, the balance of trade, and the milex GDP ratio.  The growth equation
includes  - besides the 3 other left hand variables, per capita  product, and the growth rate of agriculture.
The result of the estimation  is that the direct effect of increased  milex on growth is positive, but allowing
for the effects on savings and trade, the total - direct and indirect - effect is negative.
Besides using a simultaneous  equation  model, Deger's study has the advantage  over other studies
of allowing  for the effects of per capita  product on technical change  -a 'catch up effect' (Landau, 1986).
Unforunately, the study still has serious defects.  Deger refuses to use data past 1973 because,-45 -
"The  latest issue ... gives data for 1970-81  averages for most LDCs.  However, these
include  the pre-ofi  and post oil-shock  period, thus various  distortive  influences  are
present. Results  using  such  data cannot  be fully  trusted. It is hoped  that data for the
early 1980s,  when  the international  system  has been  able  to absorb  the traumatic  supply
shocks  of the last  decade,  wIll  be available  in the future..."
Of course  the 1980s  brought  bigger  shocks  - wasn't  this  clear  before  1986?  - so that  by Deger's
approach,  in 1992  we should  stIll only  look  at 8 out of the last 25 years. The study  has other  problems
as well. The dummy  for major  oil exporters  and  the growth  of government  expenditure  variable  are in
the equations  for the balance  of trade  and  the milex  share,  but  not  the savings  or growth  equations.  One
would  expect  them  both to influence  savings  & growth. 'Mere is no regressor  for human  capital  in the
model. Also  missing  is an allowance  for internal  political  instability.  The milex  regressor  is linear  and
unlagged  in the growth  equation.
One  problem,  which  appears  in all of the existing  studies,  is treating  military  expenditure  like  a
fixed cost which  could  not possibly  be beneficial  in itself, because  it provides  security. The various
authors allow that perhaps  there are derived or  'spin-off' benefits from military  expenditure  like
investment  in buman  capital  or infra-structure,  etc., but, that  military  expenditure  could  be beneficial  in
itself, is not considered.  As indicated  above,  a little  thought  would  indicate  almost  any country  needs
a certain  nminimum  defense  force.  Lack of minimum  protection  for lives and property  is likely  to
discourage  investment  & growth  - e.g. Lebanon. One would  expect  that, since resources  used for
military  hardware  can not  be used  for consumption  or investment,  beyond  a certain  level,  the Impact  of
increased  milex  would  be negative.  In sum,  consideration  of the reasons  for military  expenditure  would
suggest  a non-linear  relationship  between  milex  and  growth.  Implicit  - or explicit  in some  cases  - in the
existing  empirical  literature  is the assumption  that  all military  expenditure  is irrational,  that  none  of it is
motivated  by legitimate  security  considerations  (Grober  & Porter, 1989). Another  important  wealness
of all the existig literature  in this  field  is the use of regressors  which  are not  lagged. As pointed  out in
the  text  of the paper,  this means  they  are estimating  the impact  of current  military  expenditure  on current
national  product,  not the long  run effect. In addition,  the use of current  regressors  creates  questions  of
causaity; with lagged regressors, causality  is clear.Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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